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It is generally accepted that the effective and full enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is seriously 
impaired by the existence of an armed conflict or other public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation. Such a state of affairs often leads to the restricted jurisdiction and 
responsibility of states and represents a legitimate ground for derogation from the 
obligations under the ECHR. This article seeks to outline the relevant ECHR standards in 
these two perspectives of restricted state responsibility.   
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1.  Introduction 
The idea of the ECHR1 as a common post-Second World War constitutional instrument 
of European public order in the field of human rights2 has encountered many challenges in the 
ensuing years following its adoption.3 The challenges to the system came from the totalitarian 
regimes,4 terrorism,5 internal conflicts and wide-scale military and police operations,6 
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of Law. The opinions expressed are personal.  
1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols 
Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS No. 005. 
2 See Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, 30 June 2005, 
para. 156. 
3 The ECHR was open for signature by the Member States on 4 November 1950 and came into force on 3 
September 1953. 
4 See further: The Greek case of the European Commission of Human Rights (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the 
Netherlands v. Greece, no. 3321/67 et al.).  
5 Lawless v. the United Kingdom, no. 332/57, 14 November 1960. 
6 This in particular concerns the Russian government’s activities in the North Caucasus (see further P. Leach, “The 
Chechen Conflict: Analysing the Oversight of the European Court of Human Rights”, 6 European Human Rights 
Law Review (2008), pp. 732-761) and Turkish security forces’ actions in south-eastern Turkey (see further Buckley 
C., “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Life in Turkey”, 1(1) Human Rights Law Review 
(2001), 35-65).  
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complexity of the processes of transitional post-conflict justice and reconciliation,7 external 
military operations of the ECHR Member States,8 and recent armed conflicts between the 
ECHR Member States.9 This required the ECHR system to adapt to such challenges and to 
design the minimum permissible perspectives in which the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
under that Convention must be secured and respected. The case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in this context represents an invaluable source of guidance and 
authoritative determination of the protection of human rights and the rule of law.10 
The normative framework in which the ECHR rights are secured and respected is 
primarily determined by the ECHR’s jurisdictional scope. Jurisdiction in this context can be 
viewed as an exigence of the state’s responsibility to honour its engagements undertaken by the 
ECHR, which can be generally subjected to the derogation clause under Article 15 ECHR. This 
article will seek to outline the concepts of jurisdiction and responsibility of states under the 
ECHR (Part 2) and the manner in which states are permitted to derogate from their obligations 
under that Convention (Part 3). In conclusion, it will put the two perspectives of state 
responsibility into the contemporary context (Part 4). 
2.  Jurisdiction and state responsibility under the ECHR 
Rather than engaging in the contentious doctrinal debates of international public law 
over the relationship between the notions of “jurisdiction” and “state responsibility” and 
“attribution,”11 an answer to a more practical question is in order: what is it that determines the 
notion of jurisdiction in international human rights law? 
                                                             
7 A number of issues have arisen in the context of the post-conflict transitional justice in the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia (see, for example, Marguš v. Croatia [GC], no. 4455/10, 27 May 2014).   
8 In particular, the military operations in Iraq (see, for example, Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, 
16 September 2014). 
9 This gave rise to a number of Inter-state cases, such as Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, 10 May 2001; 
Georgia v. Russia [GC], no. 13255/07, 3 July 2014. However, it also gave rise to individual applications, with a 
strong inter-state inspiration, such as Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, 16 June 2015; Chiragov and 
Others v. Armenia [GC], no. 13216/05, 16 June 2015. 
10 A strong argument of indissociably related concepts of human rights and the rule of law was made by Tom 
Bingham in his seminal book The Rule of Law (Penguin 2011). Without intending to disagree with that assertion, 
it should be noted that the rule of law, as a guarantee of predetermined and predictable conduct governed by the 
authoritative rules expressing many of the dignitarian and functional aspects of the protection of individual rights, 
may exist even in the legal orders which are not governed by the human rights considerations, at least as they are 
nominally denoted in contemporary legal discourses. See in this respect the observance of the rights of the accused 
in the context of the trial following the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo in June 1914 (T. Vander Beken, K. Kamber and J. Jassens, “Gavrilo Princip voor criminologen”, 35(6) 
Panopticon (2014), pp. 491-501). 
11 There are in principle two approaches which diverge over the question whether the notion of “jurisdiction” also 
encompasses the issue of “attribution.” In general, according to one approach, the notion of jurisdiction is distinct 
to that of “attribution” of a human rights violation to the state whereas the other approach advocates that the two 
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Some commentators have argued that the notion of jurisdiction in international human 
rights law does not necessarily correspond to the notion of jurisdiction in general international 
law.12 In general, the latter understanding of “jurisdiction” relates to the capacity of a state to 
legislate in a particular territory (prescriptive jurisdiction), to secure compliance with its laws 
(enforcement jurisdiction), and to secure the resolution of legal disputes before its courts 
(adjudicative jurisdiction).13 On the other hand, the notion of jurisdiction in international human 
rights law could be seen a factual power of a state over persons under its jurisdiction. More 
precisely, jurisdiction in human rights law is the possibility of a state to exercise factual power 
and authority over individuals.14 
This distinction between the notions of jurisdiction in general international law and 
international human rights law has never been clearly made in the case-law of the ECtHR15 and 
it is not the intention of this article to argue in favour of one of the positions. It should be noted, 
however, that when designing various modes of jurisdiction, there has been a strong tendency 
by the ECtHR to regard the question of jurisdiction and responsibility as the possibility of the 
state to exercise factual power and authority over individuals. It will be therefore taken as a 
working premise of the present discussion that the state jurisdiction under the ECHR is 
determined on the basis of the general international law and specific human rights law 
considerations. 
The principal jurisdictional competence under the ECHR is based on the principle of 
territoriality. This primarily includes the state territory proper, that is to say the internationally 
recognised territory of the state.16 This means that the state may be held responsible for 
infringements or its failure to secure the ECHR rights to all those individuals who are in its 
internationally recognised territory. This, of course, also includes any board craft and vessels 
registered in, or flying the flag of, that state.17 
                                                             
notions are interchangeable. See further: O. de Schutter, International Human Rights Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2014), pp. 147-148.      
12 M. Milanović, “From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights 
Treaties”, 8(3) Human Rights Law Review (2008), p. 417; S. Miller, “Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A 
Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention”, 20(4) European Journal 
of International Law (2010), p. 1231. 
13 D. Ireland-Piper, “Prosecutions of Extraterritorial Criminal Conduct and the Abuse of Rights Doctrine”, 9(4) 
Utrecht Law Review (2013), p. 69 
14 See further: Milanović, supra n. 12, pp. 436-447. 
15 The ECtHR has stressed that “the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Article 1 [ECHR] must be 
considered as reflecting the position under public international law” (Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, 8 
April 2004, para. 137) 
16 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para. 131 
17 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others [GC], no. 52207/99, 12 December 2001, para. 73; ECtHR 
(Judgment) Bakanova v. Lithuania, no. 11167/12, 31 May 2016, para. 63. 
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The territorial jurisdiction of a state is a legal premise. The ECtHR has held that 
jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State’s territory.18 This is also 
denoted as a “presumption of competence.”19 The presumption in question may be rebutted 
where a State is unable to exercise its authority in part of its territory. This is ordinarily a result 
of the following factors: (1) military occupation by the armed forces of another state, which 
therefore has an effective control of the territory in question,20 (2) acts of war or rebellion 
preventing the state to exercise factual power and authority in the territory concerned, and (3) 
the installation of a separatist regime within the territory of the state supported by the acts of a 
foreign state.21  
In all these instances the state concerned has no capability to exercise factual power and 
authority over individuals residing on the territory out of its factual control. The state has 
therefore limited territorial jurisdiction. This was, for instance, the case with the Moldovan 
jurisdiction over its eastern region, now known as Transdniestria, where a separatist regime of 
the “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”) was established. The ECtHR found that 
the “MRT” had been established as a result of Russian military assistance and that the continued 
Russian military and armaments presence there was a strong signal of Russia’s continued 
military support for the separatists. Moreover, the population were dependent on free or highly 
subsidised gas supplies, pensions and other financial aid from Russia. This accordingly brought 
the region in question under the Russian jurisdiction and limited the jurisdiction and the nature 
of Moldovan responsibility with regard to that territory.22 On the other hand, in the case of 
Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan, the ECtHR has declined to consider “disputed areas” in Gulistan, which 
were subject to intense military operations, as falling out of the territorial jurisdiction and 
responsibility of Azerbaijan.23 
The existence of limited territorial jurisdiction does not mean that the state’s 
“jurisdiction” nominally ceases.24 What it means is that the state’s “responsibility” is modified 
and adjusted by being limited only to discharging positive obligations.25 In this particular 
                                                             
18 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, para. 312. 
19 Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, 16 June 2015, para. 127. 
20 Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, 10 May 2001, paras. 76-80.  
21 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, para. 312. 
22 See further: Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138/10, 23 February 2016, paras. 101-
112. 
23 Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, 16 June 2015, paras. 150-151. 
24 Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, 19 October, 2012, para. 
109. 
25 In general, the positive obligations are a requirement on the state to take action or to do something, while the 
negative obligations denote a duty of the state to abstain from unjustified interference with the rights of an 
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context, the discharging positive obligations implies two groups of actions that the state must 
undertake: (1) measures to assert or re-assert its sovereignty over the territory and to refrain 
from any acts supporting the separatist regime, and (2) measures of judicial, political, or 
administrative nature aimed at securing individual human rights.26 The latter may include issues 
such as securing the respect for rights of detained individuals27 or securing educational rights.28 
In addition to the territorial and limited territorial jurisdiction, the responsibility of the 
state under the ECHR may arise with regard to the actions taken out of its internationally 
recognised territory. The ECtHR has explained, however, that this will occur only 
exceptionally. Nevertheless, when the jurisdiction is extended over the principle of 
territoriality, it will be irrelevant whether the extension of the jurisdiction relates to the territory 
of an ECHR Contracting Party or not.29 The extension of the jurisdiction over the principle of 
territoriality will normally occur in two forms. 
The first form of the extended jurisdiction is “effective control of an area.” Such a 
control may be a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action of a state through which it 
exercises effective control of an area outside its internationally recognised national territory. In 
such instances, the local administration survives as a result of the state’s military and other 
support, which is sufficient for attracting the state’s responsibility for the observance of the 
ECHR rights.30 
The second form of the extended jurisdiction concerns the acts of the state authorities 
which produce effects outside the state’s own territory. The most common modes of this 
jurisdictional notion include: (1) the acts of diplomatic and consular agents of the state, who 
are present on a foreign territory in accordance with international law, exerting authority and 
control over others, (2) the exercise of public powers, such as executive or judicial, by the state 
authorities on foreign territory through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the local 
government, and (3) the exercise of physical power and control over a person by the use of 
force by state agents operating outside the state’s territory.31 
The above discussion has shown that the ECHR jurisdictional scope has a strong basis 
in the standard jurisdictional principles of international public law (the principle of territorial 
                                                             
individual (D. Shelton and A. Gould, “Positive and Negative Obligations”, in D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013), p. 566).  
26 Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, 16 June 2015, para. 131. 
27 Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 11138/10, 23 February 2016, paras. 151-155. 
28 Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, 19 October, 2012, 
para.109. 
29 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, paras. 131 and 142. 
30 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, para. 314. 
31 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, paras. 133-137. 
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jurisdiction). At the same time, the possibility of a state to exercise factual power and authority 
over individuals is what predominantly determines the state’s jurisdiction and authority in cases 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. There are also modes of state responsibility developed in the 
ECtHR case-law that do not fit easily in either of the two theories of state “jurisdiction” and 
“responsibility.” A telling example in this context is the limited territorial jurisdiction where 
the state has certain human rights obligations although it does not exercise prescriptive, 
enforcement or adjudicative jurisdiction in the territory concerned nor does it have a possibility 
to exercise factual power and authority over individuals on that territory. 
It therefore follows that it is difficult, and arguably inutile, to try to fit the concept of 
state jurisdiction and responsibility under the ECHR to any predesigned jurisdictional theory. 
The central question is rather whether there is a possibility for the state in question to honour 
its engagements undertaken by the ECHR. The extent of such a possibility will proportionally 
determine the scope of its “jurisdiction” and “responsibility.”  
In the context of an armed conflict or other public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, the state will ordinarily have limited capacities in guaranteeing the rights and freedoms 
under the ECHR to the individuals under its jurisdiction and responsibility. Subject to the 
conditions provided for in Article 15 ECHR, the state will in such instances have a possibility 
to derogate from its duties under that Convention. It remains to be seen in what manner and 
under which legal constrains can the state exercise such a possibility of derogation.  
3.  Derogation from the ECHR obligations 
It is widely accepted that there are two central authoritative legal documents guiding the 
interpretation and application of the derogation clauses in international human rights law:32 the 
Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency (“the Paris 
Minimum Standards”),33 and the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the Siracusa 
Principles”).34 
The Paris Minimum Standards were adopted by the International Law Association at its 
61st Conference held in Paris in 1984 as an attempt to provide guiding principles for a bona 
                                                             
32 See further: De Schutter, supra n. 11, pp. 583-584. 
33 R.B. Lillich, “The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency”, 79 American 
Journal of International Law (1985), 1072-1081.   
34 UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 September 1984, E/CN.4/1985/4. 
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fide application of the derogation clauses under the three central instruments of international 
human rights law: Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),35 Article 15 ECHR, and Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR).36 This document is structurally divided into three section. Section A defines the 
concept of emergency, its declaration, duration and control. Section B provides for the general 
principles governing the emergency powers and the protection of individuals, and Section C 
lists draft articles of the particular “non-derogable” rights and freedoms. 
The Paris Minimum Standards reaffirm the principle according to which the declaration 
of a state of emergency will be justified only in the case of the existence of a “public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation,” which must be officially proclaimed (Section A.1.a). 
The “public emergency” referred to in this context concerns an “exceptional situation of crisis 
or public danger, actual or imminent, which affects the whole population or the whole 
population of the area to which the declaration applies and constitutes a threat to the organised 
life of the community” (Section A.1.b). 
On the procedural level, the Paris Minimum Standards provide that the procedure for 
declaring a state of emergency should be defined under the constitution and that any prerogative 
of the executive authority in this respect must be subjected to a prompt confirmation by the 
legislature (Section A.2). It also envisages the necessity of a judicial or other review of the 
declaration of emergency at the international level by the relevant institutions, and at the 
national level by the bodies empowered by the constitution and other legal instruments 
(Sections A.7 and B.5). Moreover, any declaration of a state of emergency should not exceed 
the period which is “strictly required” to restore normal functioning of the society; the duration 
of emergency, save for the case of war, should be for a fixed term period; every extension 
should be also for a predetermined fixed period of time and made by way of a new declaration 
before the expiry of the initial period, and every extension should be based on a prior approval 
by the legislature (Section A.3). Upon the termination of a state of emergency, the full 
restoration of rights and freedoms must come into effect (Section A.6). With regard to the 
territorial scope, the declaration of a state of emergency may cover the entire territory of a state 
or only part of its territory, and this may change depending of the development of the situation 
of emergency (Section A.4). 
                                                             
35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
999, p. 171 
36 American Convention on Human Rights, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969. 
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The Paris Minimum Standards condition the application of the measures of derogation 
form international human rights obligations with the following general conditions: (1) the 
compliance with the notification requirements, as provided under the particular treaty, (2) the 
existence of proportionality between the measures applied and the exigencies of the situation, 
(3) consistency with the measures applied with other obligations of the state under international 
law, (4) non-discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, nationality 
or social origin, and (5) recognition of non-derogability of the “basic rights and freedoms” 
guaranteed by international law (Section B.2). In addition, the Paris Minimum Standards set 
out the principles securing the functioning of legislature and judiciary in the country during the 
state of emergency (Section B.3). 
The draft articles of the Paris Minimum Standards list the following non-derogable 
rights and freedoms: right to legal personality (Article 1), freedom from slavery or servitude 
(Article 2), freedom from discrimination (Article 3), right to life (Article 4), right to liberty 
(Article 5), freedom from torture (Article 6), right to a fair trial (Article 8), freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Article 9), rights of minorities (Article 10), rights of the family (Article 
11), right to a name (Article 12), rights of the child (Article 13), right to nationality (Article 
14), right to participate in government (Article 15), and right to a remedy (Article 16). 
The Siracusa Principles are the result of a high-level international conference held in 
Siracusa (Italy) in 1984 where law professors, practitioners and other experts in human rights 
discussed the limitation and derogation provisions of the ICCPR. The document was later 
circulated as an official document of the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s 
Commission on Human Rights. The Siracusa Principles identify and proclaim a close 
relationship between respect for human rights, the maintenance of international peace and 
security and development in the broadest sense. In Part I, they deal more specifically with the 
limitation clauses in the ICCPR, and in Part II they provide the necessary guiding definitions 
of measures of derogations in a public emergency. 
The Siracusa Principles define the “public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation” as a situation of exceptional and actual or imminent danger which threatens the life of 
the nation in a sense that it affects the whole of the population and either the whole or part of 
the territory of the State, and threatens the physical integrity of the population, the political 
independence or the territorial integrity of a state or the existence or basic functioning of 
institutions indispensable to ensure and protect the right s recognised in the ICCPR (para. 39). 
In this connection, further explanation is provided with regard to the internal conflicts and 
unrests and the economic difficulties. In particular, the internal conflicts and unrests which do 
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not constitute a grave and imminent threat to the life of the nation cannot justify derogations 
under the ICCPR (para. 40). Likewise, economic difficulties as such cannot justify the 
introduction of derogation measures (para. 41). 
The Siracusa Principles also provide a useful guidance for the understanding of the 
requirement of necessity in the introduction of the derogation measures. They stress that the 
scope of any derogation measure must be strictly necessary to deal with the threat to the life of 
the nation and proportionate to its nature and extent (para. 51). However, if a measure justified 
by a limitation clause under the ICCPR is adequate to deal with the situation, a derogation for 
the achievement of the same aim will not be permissible (para. 53). The principle of necessity 
must be applied in an objective manner which means that any measure must target an actual, 
clear, present or imminent danger and should not be used for the apprehension of potential 
danger (para. 54). There should also be an independent and periodic review of the necessity of 
derogation and effective remedies should exist in order to determine whether the derogation 
measures are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (sections 55-56).  
The Siracusa Principles also refer to the non-derogable rights and freedoms under the 
ICCPR: the right to life, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, and from medical or scientific experimentation without free consent, freedom from 
slavery or involuntary servitude, the right not to be imprisoned for contractual debt, the right 
not to be convicted or sentenced to a heavier penalty by virtue of retroactive criminal legislation, 
the right to recognition as a person before the law, and freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (para. 58). 
The substantive requirements and the process of derogation under the ECHR is in 
harmony with the standards set out in the two discussed international documents. The normative 
basis for a derogation under the ECHR is provided for in Article 15.37 This provision sets the 
elements of a valid derogation in connection with: (1) the existence of relevant circumstances 
allowing for a derogation and compliance with the limits set out in Article 15 § 1; (2) prohibition 
                                                             
37 This provision reads:  
“1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party 
may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law. 
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from 
Articles 3, 4 § 1 and 7 shall be made under this provision. 
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also 
inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the 
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.” 
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of derogation from certain rights (Article 15 § 2), and (3) the observance of the notification 
requirements (Article 15 § 3). 
Similar to the derogations under the ICCPR, the validity of a derogation under the 
ECHR is relevant only if the measures taken by the Government cannot be justified under the 
restriction clauses or the definitional scope of the substantive articles under that Convention.38 
This means that in the case of an allegation that a particular governmental action or omission 
has breached an ECHR right, the ECtHR will first examine whether the action or omission in 
question can be otherwise justified under the relevant substantive provision. Only when that is 
not possible, the issue of derogation becomes relevant. The ratio behind such an approach can 
be traced to the usual practices of States when lodging a derogation to submit that its measures 
“may” involve a derogation from the Convention.39 
The relevant substantive requirements justifying a derogation under Article 15 § 1 have 
two limbs. The first is the existence of a “war” and the second is the existence of a “public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation.” The ECtHR has not so far interpreted the meaning 
of the term “war” in this context. This is, however, of a secondary importance for the application 
of a derogation given that the situation ordinarily qualifying as a “war” is also likely to be 
considered as a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation.”40   
A public emergency threatening the life of the nation is “an exceptional situation of 
crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised 
life of the community of which the State is composed.”41 Such a threat must be imminent, which 
means that it might occur without warning at any time. However, it cannot imply a requirement 
for a state to wait for a disaster to happen in order to constitute a threat as imminent.42 
In the assessment of the imminence of a threat to the life of the nation regard must be 
primarily held to those facts which were known at the time of the derogation. This does not 
mean that an information which later comes to light cannot inform the ECtHR’s decision with 
regard to its assessment of the validity of a derogation.43 This may be of a particular importance 
for the methodology of assessment of the validity of a derogation given that some states of 
emergency may last for a prolonged period of time and the derogation may therefore be 
                                                             
38 A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para. 161. 
39 Guide on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe/European Court of 
Human Rights 2016), p. 5. 
40 Ibid., p. 6. 
41 Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), no. 332/57, 1 July 1961, para. 28 
42 A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para. 177. 
43 Loc. cit. 
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warranted throughout the period in question.44 When the derogation is no longer in force and 
the relevant rights and freedoms under the ECHR become applicable, this does not preclude the 
ECtHR from taking into account the background circumstances of the case in the assessment 
of a proper compliance with the relevant Article under the ECHR.45 
Derogation may be applied with regard to the whole or part of the territory. Accordingly, 
the term “threatening the life of the nation” under Article 5 § 1 also encompasses actual or 
imminent threats to the particular parts of a country. However, if a state has decided to make a 
derogation only with regard to a particular part of its territory, then it cannot invoke the 
derogation for the whole of the territory under its jurisdiction.46 In this connection, it should be 
also noted that so far no State has ever made a derogation in respect of its extraterritorial 
activities, although a number of the ECHR Member States are engaged in extraterritorial 
military missions.47 This accordingly means that, to the extent that an individual falls under the 
jurisdiction of a state engaged in an extraterritorial military mission, the state in question is 
under an obligation to secure all the ECHR guarantees to such an individual under its 
jurisdiction. 
The assessment of necessity of the application of derogation is made with regard to the 
test of “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” provided for in Article 15 § 1 ECHR. 
In making that assessment the ECtHR applies the standard doctrine of subsidiarity. This in 
particular means that it is primarily for the domestic authorities to determine whether the life 
of their nation is threatened by a public emergency and, if so, what is necessary to be taken in 
order to effectively respond to the emergency. In these matters, the states have a wide margin 
of appreciation. However, that is not an unfettered power allocated to the authorities. It always 
remains for the ECtHR to determine whether the state has remained within the margin of 
appreciation or has taken measures which are not strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation. In making that assessment, the ECtHR will have regard to the following factors: the 
nature of the rights affected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to, and the duration 
of, the emergency situation.48 
An overview of the ECtHR case-law shows that the relevant factors taken in this context 
include: (1) the assessment whether other ordinary laws could adequately deal with the 
                                                             
44 Guide on Article 15, supra n. 39, pp. 6-7. 
45 Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 11209/84 et al., 29 November 1988, para. 48.    
46 Aksoy v. Turkey, no. 21987/93, 18 December 1996, para. 70; Yurttas v. Turkey, nos. 25143/94 and 27098/95, 27 
May 2004, para. 58.    
47 Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, 16 September 2014, para. 101. 
48 Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, nos. 14553/89 and 14554/89, 26 May 1993, para. 43.     
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exigencies of the situation; (2) whether the measures taken by the authorities are genuine and 
bona fide; (3) what is the scope of the derogation and what are the reasons justifying it; (4) 
whether the derogation was kept under supervision and, if appropriate, attenuated; (5) the 
existence of safeguards, in particular of an effective judicial control, and (6) absence of any 
discrimination.49 
In addition to the above requirements, Article 15 § 1 ECHR prohibits the states to adopt 
measures “inconsistent with [their] other obligations under international law.” This does, not, 
however, mean that the ECtHR will carry out a thorough assessment of the obligations flowing 
from other sources of international law nor that it will define authoritatively the particular 
aspects of such obligations. Nevertheless, the ECtHR must satisfy itself that there is no plausible 
basis for a suspicion that the measure taken by the state is not inconsistent with its other 
international obligations.50 
The non-derogable rights under Article 15 § 2 are: Article 2 (right to life); Article 3 
(prohibition of torture); Article 4 § 1 (prohibition of slavery or servitude), and Article 7 (no 
punishment without law). In addition, Protocols 651 and 1352 to the ECHR exclude the 
possibility of a derogation from the prohibition of death penalty, and Article 4 of Protocol No. 
753 from the ne bis in idem principle (right not to be tried or punished twice for the same 
offence). 
The non-derogability of a right means that it continues to apply irrespective of a 
derogation introduced by the state. This means that they operate with their full strength and 
relevance even in the times of war or other public emergency. The only exceptions to this rule 
concern Article 2, which has a restriction only with regard to the deaths resulting from lawful 
acts of war, and Article 7 (§ 2) which otherwise does not prevent the trial and punishment for 
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. It should be noted, however, that the 
cited restriction under Article 7 will not be of a particular relevance as it is only a contextual 
                                                             
49 See further: Guide on Article 15, supra n. 39, p. 8. 
50 Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, nos. 14553/89 and 14554/89, 26 May 1993, paras. 67-73.     
51 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning 
the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 28 April 1983, ETS No.114.   
52 Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning 
the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, 3 May 2002, ETS No. 187. 
53 Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 22 November 
1984, ETS No. 117. 
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clarification of Article 7, included so as to ensure that there was no doubt about the validity of 
prosecutions after the Second World War in respect of the crimes committed during that war.54 
Lastly, the validity of a derogation under the ECHR will also depend on the compliance 
with the notification requirements under Article 15 § 3 ECHR. The Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe must be fully informed of the measures taken and the reasons therefore as 
well as any change in the regime of the application of the measures in question. The central 
purpose of the notification requirement is to make the derogation public and known to the other 
Member States of the Council of Europe system. In addition, it also implies a necessity to keep 
the need for the derogation under constant review.55 
The notification is usually made by writing a letter to the Secretary General by which 
the reasons for the derogation are provided and copies of the legal texts under which the 
emergency measures will be taken are attached, with an explanation of their purpose. The 
notification must be made without any “unavoidable delay” following the introduction of the 
relevant derogation measure. A period of twelve days was found to be sufficient whereas the 
periods of three and four months were considered to be inadequate to meet the necessary 
requirement under the ECHR.56   
4.  Instead of Conclusion 
It is an inevitable concession to reality that the discussions on derogations from the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR are becoming the mainstream political and 
legal discourse in confronting often complex and multidimensional political and security 
challenges facing the European countries. Indeed, since the creation of the ECHR system of 
human rights protection there were in total eight derogations from that Convention (by Albania, 
Armenia, France, Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Turkey and the United Kingdom) whereas in the 
period of a year (between June 2015 and July 2016) three States (Ukraine, France and Turkey) 
have introduced the emergency measures and announced derogation from their ECHR 
obligations.57   
It is hard to argue that the derogations which France, Ukraine and Turkey recently 
introduced were not aimed at addressing “the emergencies threatening the life of the nation” 
                                                             
54 Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, 18 July 2013, para. 
72.    
55 Guide on Article 15, supra n. 39, p. 11. 
56 Loc. cit. 
57 See further: Factsheet – Derogation in time of emergency (ECHR 2017). 
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related to the acts of terror, insurgency and war and political unrests respectively. The French 
derogation followed the large-scale terrorist attacks which had taken place in the Paris region 
in November 2015 and the introduction of the emergency measures was justified with reference 
to the necessity to prevent the commission of further terrorist attacks.58 The Turkish derogation 
was introduced in response to the large-scale coup attempt in July 2016 aimed at overthrowing 
the government,59 and the Ukrainian derogation was made with regard to the annexation and 
temporary occupation of the integral part of its internationally recognised territory (Crimea and 
the city of Sevastopol) and the insurgencies and security operations in other parts of its territory 
(Donetsk and Luhansk regions).60 
However, even if accepting the necessity of introduction of derogation and emergency 
measures at a political level, the difficulty from the perspective of human rights and the rule of 
law relates to the fact that human rights abuses are often associated with states of emergency.61 
The governments must therefore be ready to justify the measures taken in the light of the 
relevant substantive and procedural ECHR requirements. This will, on the one hand, legitimise 
their political decision to introduce the emergency measures and, on the other hand, secure an 
effective protection of human rights and the rule of law to the individuals concerned with the 
introduction of such measures. 
The verification of the governmental justification in question is a shared task of the 
national courts and the ECtHR.62 In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it is primarily 
for the ECHR Member States that have introduced derogation and emergency measures to 
comply with the relevant ECHR standards in that respect and to secure that the introduction of 
the emergency measures does not represent a negation of the very concepts of human rights and 
the rule of law.  
The states must put in place adequate safeguards from abuses, in particular through an 
effective judicial control. It is through such institutions that a dialogue between the affected 
individuals and the political decision-makers must take place and only then will the government 
                                                             
58 Declaration contained in a Note verbale from the Permanent Representation of France, dated 24 November 2015, 
registered at the Secretariat General on 24 November 2015, available at 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-reservations-and-declarations (last visited 27 January 2017). 
59 Declaration contained in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Turkey, dated 21 July 2016, registered 
at the Secretariat General on 21 July 2016, available at http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-
reservations-and-declarations (last visited 27 January 2017). 
60 Derogation contained in a Note verbale from the Permanent Representation of Ukraine, dated 5 June 2015, 
registered at the Secretariat General on 9 June 2015, available at http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-
on-reservations-and-declarations (last visited 27 January 2017). 
61 See further: M. O’Boyle, “Emergency Government and Derogation under the ECHR”, 4 European Human 
Rights Law Review (2016), 331-341. 
62 Ibid., p. 340. 
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be able to legitimise derogation and emergency measures. It is a hope that states will stand up 
to that commitment.   
